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I. INTRODUCTION
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,' the Supreme Court held
that the interpretation of patent claims2 is a question of law to be
determined by the court rather than a question of fact to be decided by
thejury.3 The Court based its holding on the belief that judges are better
suited than juries to address claim interpretation issues and that claim
interpretation by the court would result in greater uniformity in the
treatment of patents. The Markman decision, however, has confronted
the district courts with a host of thorny questions, such as what evidence
they may consider in their determinations and what issues should be
decided in the course of claim construction. In addition, in the process
of claim construction, district court judges have had to overcome the
limitations associated with their status as lay persons, lacking "skill in
the art" about which they must make critical decisions. And, although
the Supreme Court may have anticipated that its holding would, through
stare decisis, lead to greater intrajurisdictional uniformity in the
treatment of a given patent, it may not have anticipated another result:
that de novo appellate review would promote frequent reversals by the
Federal Circuit and thus deprive litigating parties of certainty in a given
case.
One of the most intractable issues created by Markman is one of
timing: when in the litigation process should the so-called "Markman
hearing" take place? Although the district courts have considered and
implemented a variety of options, no single answer has been readily
forthcoming. Instead, each of the several option§ has its own perceived"
advantages and disadvantages. The court may hold the hearing at any of
the following times: 1) at the outset of the litigation, 2) after fact
1. 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (hereinafter Markman).
2. In addition to a specification that, inter alia, provides a written description of the
invention, a patent contains one or more "claims," which "particularly point!' out and
distinctly claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35
U.S.C. § 112 (1994). A patent claim covers and secures a process, a machine, a
manufacture, or a composition ofmatter, as well as a design for an article of manufacture.
It does not, however, cover "the function or result" of an invention. Nor does it cover the
scientific explanation of its operation. 1 DONALD S. CIusUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-7 (1998).
To prove infringement, a patentee mustprove that an accused product or process has
each limitation set forth in a specific claim. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 374. This
showing can be made only after the meaning of the words contained in the claim has been
determined. See id. Prior to the Markman decision, it was often the jury's task to
determine the meaning of those words after hearing the evidence - including expert
testimony - presented at trial. See id.
3. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
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discovery but before expert discovery, 3) after all discovery, 4) at the
time summary judgment motions are considered, or 5) sometime after
opening arguments, whether that be immediately after the trial begins,
or just prior to the court's instruction of the jury.
This Article argues that, in most cases, there is an optimal time for
holding the Marlanan hearing. Part II provides a short summary of both
the Federal Circuit's holding in Marknan P4 and the rationale behind the
Supreme Court's affirmance of that holding. It then delves into the
predictable effects of Markman, as well as into the maze of questions
that the decision has engendered and the ways in which the district
courts have answered those questions. Part III discusses the issue of the
timing of claim construction hearings, presenting at the outset the
possible alternatives. It argues that holding Markman hearings very
early in the course of litigation is undesirable and inefficient, as is
holding them any time after opening arguments during the infringement
trial. Rather, the optimal time for the claim construction hearing is, in
most cases, after discovery but before the trial begins - specifically, at
the time of the court's consideration of summary judgment motions.
II. MA4RKMAN AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. The Markman Holding
In Markman, the Supreme Court considered whether patent claim
interpretation is a matter of law to be addressed by judges or an issue
falling under the province of the Seventh Amendment guarantee to atrial
by jury. The sharply divided Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
had held en banc that claim interpretation is the "exclusive province of
the court,"5 and that such a conclusion was fully consistent with the
Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial." The majority of the Federal
Circuit noted that the description of an invention that is contained in a
patent must enable "one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use it"7
and, further, that patent claims must state distinctly "the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."8 Applying the principle
that "the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the
4. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(hereinafter Markman 1).
5. Marlanan, 517 U.S. at 376.
6. See id. The Seventh Amendmentprovides that, "[i]n Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved...." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
7. -Markman 1, 52 F.3d at 978 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)).
8. Id at 986 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)).
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court," the majority concluded that "a patent is uniquely suited for
having its meaning and scope determined entirely by a court as a matter
of law."9 The majority additionally pointed out that a rule that makes
claim construction the province of the court promotes certainty.
[I]t is only fair (and statutorily required) that
competitors beable to ascertain to a reasonable degree
the scope of the patentee's right to exclude. They may
understand what is the scope of the patent owner's
rights by obtaining the patent and prosecution
history - "the undisputed public record" - *and
applying established rules of construction to the
language of the patent claim in the context of the
patent.10
According to the Federal Circuit, because it is ajudge who will interpret
the patent claims, competitors can "rest assured" that, in the event of
infringement litigation, "the true and consistent scope of the patent
owner's rights to be given legal effect" will be discerned."
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, unanimously holding that
patent claim interpretation is a matter of law forthe court andnot subject
to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Focusing largely on
Seventh Amendment issues, the Court reviewed common law practice
at the time the Constitution was drafted and concluded that the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee did not apply to patent claim interpretation. 2
Thus, the Court proceeded to "consult existing precedent and consider
both the relative interpretive skills ofjudges and juries and the statutory
policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation."' 3 Finding no "clear
answers" in relevant precedent, the Court turned finally to functional
considerations, concluding that "judges, not juries, are the better suited
to find the acquired meaning of patent terms," and that construing
written instruments is a basic task for which judges are trained and
9. Id. at 978 (internal citations omitted).
10. Id. at 978-79 (internal citations omitted).
11. Id (internal citations omitted). Judge Mayer concurred in theresultbut disagreed
that claim construction should be removed from the jury, referring to the majority's
holding as "bizarre" and contrary to the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 989, 992-93.
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that claim construction is a factual, not a legal, matter
and that the case should be remanded so that the district court could evaluate whether the
jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence. See id at 1000-26.
12. See Marlanan, 517 U.S. at 384.
13. Id.
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which they frequently perform.' 4 In addition, the Court noted, requiring
judges to construe patent claims would result in greater consistency in
claim interpretation and serve "uniformity in the treatment of a given
patent."15 It stated that, "whereas issue preclusion could not be asserted
against new and independent infringement defendants even within a
given jurisdiction, treating interpretive issues as purely legal will
promote... intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare
decisis."' 6
B. Markman's Expected Effects
As Judge Newman predicted in her dissent to Markman I, one result
of making claim construction a legal issue has been the creation of a
separate hearing- the Markman hearing-which has become in many
instances a "preliminary trial" during which the court receives argument
or testimony regarding claim construction. 7 Indeed, since Markman,
these hearings have become the most common avenue through which
courts interpret claims. And, because they may be held prior to the trial,
they have become an important and decisive focus of patent litigation.
However, as discussed later, little about the specifics of these hearings
is settled, including the timing of the hearing and the type of evidence
the court may hear.
Another expected result of Markman has been an increase in the
number of motions foi summary judgment and partial summary
judgment on matters of claim construction and infringement.'" Although
summary judgment on issues of claim interpretation historically was
denied as requiring resolution of disputed issues of fact, 9 Markman's
holding that claim construction is a question of law "dispelled any
14. Id. at 388.
15. Id at 390.
16. Id. at 391.
17. See William F. Lee & Wayne L. Stoner, The Role ofExpert Witness on Liability
Issues in Patent Litigation in Light ofMarkman v. Westview Instruments, in WINNNG
STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION 647, 663 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series, No. 423, 1995).
18. See Robert C.,Scheinfeld, Patent and Trademark Law: "Marlanan" Issues
Ready for Supreme Court Review, N.Y.U., Dec. 15, 1995, at 9 ("As evidenced by this
case and others pending in this court, in view of Markman, parties will now routinely
move for the early resolution of the claim construction issue either under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 or 12(b)(6).").
19. See Frank M. Gasparo, Note, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and its
Procedural Shock Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 723, 762-63 (1997);
see also Continuous Curve Contact Lenses, Inc. v. Rynco Scientific Corp., 680 F.2d 605,
606 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has been "unsympathetic to summary
judgments in patent cases").
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lingering doubts about whether patent claims are to be characterized as
posing factual issues."'2 In many cases, there is no factual question as
to the nature and operation of the accused devise, and, therefore, the
infringement issue can be disposed of at the summary judgment stage.1
The only remaining question will be claim construction, and the court's
resolution of this question of law will be the decisive issue in the case.'
Indeed, in the wake of Markman, an ever-increasing number of Federal
Circuit decisions have resolved the question of infringement as a matter
of law.' This noticeable growth in the number of decisions on
infringement as a matter of law is the combined result of Markman and
the clear directive of Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.' that the district courts should decide infringement as a
matter of law in appropriate circumstances.'
Although the emergence of claim construction hearings and an
increased number of summary judgment motions were relatively
predictable effects, Markman has also left in its wake many unsettled
questions regarding the procedure to be followed in interpreting claims,
as well as the role of the court in the claim construction process. As
various articles and commentaries have already pointed out, the timing
and procedures that judges are to follow in interpreting claims are far
from settled, and courts' practices in interpreting claim language have
20. Gasparo, supranote 19, at 763; ElfAtochemN. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Del. 1995) (noting that one result ofMarknan will be an
increase in summaryjudgment motions).
21. See Gasparo, supra note 19, at 764-65 (quoting Michael A. Lechter, Simplifying
Patent Infringement Litigation, WASH. TECH., Apr. 27, 1995, at 23).
22. See id.; see also Mason v. Tampa G Mfg. Co., 68 F.3d 488 (Table), No. 95-1184,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28368 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 12, 1995) (Text) (affirming summary
judgment of non-infringement based on the conclusion that no factual issues existed
relating to the structure and operation of the accused device); Lovelett v. Peavey Elecs.
Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (construing disputed patent claims
and granting defendant's summary judgment motion).
23. See, e.g., Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Ba v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998); EMI Group N.
Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Desper Prods., Inc. v. Qsound
Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Tronzo v. Biomet,,Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
24. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
25. See id. at 39 n.8. However, when the nature of the accused device is neither
"clearly understood by the court [n]or stipulated to-by the parties," there will be a factual
dispute, and the court's claim interpretation will not dispose of the infringement question.
See Gasparo, supra note 19, at 765. In such a situation, the case continues to trial, but
the only inquiry is whether the accused devise infringes the claims in issue as interpreted
by the court. See, e.g., Kulpreet S. Rana, Purifying a Mongrel Practice, IP MAG., May
1998, at 12, 14.
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varied wildly.26 This divergence in approach derives in large part from
the well established principlethat claim interpretation must be conducted
from the perspective of "one skilled in the art" of the subject matter of
the patent claim. Yet, only rarely does a judge fall into that category.
Rather, unlike the situation in which a judge is interpreting a statute or
a contract, in the process of claim construction he or she is essentially a
layperson. As a result, courts must confront the issues of precisely what
should be decided at a Markman hearing and what evidence - intrinsic,
extrinsic, or otherwise27 - should be considered in the claim
interpretation process. But among the most vexing questions raised by
Markman is whether claim interpretation should take place early in the
case, at some point after discovery, or at the jury instruction phase of the
trial. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has settled this
question, leaving district courts to struggle with it.
As the following discussion demonstrates, determining the best point
in the litigation process for claim construction cannot be done
independent of consideration of numerous other issues raised by
Markman. In particular, as Section C points out, Mar/kman and its
progeny have generated substantial confusion as to the proper use of
evidence other than the patent and its file history. In addition, there is
the question, discussed in Section D, of the impact of the appellate
process on the goals of certainty and predictability articulated in
Markman. Finally, Section E observes that the mixed implications of
Markman for the finality of claim interpretation have substantially
affected the willingness of parties to settle. These questions concerning
appropriate evidence, appellate review, and settlement combine to make
the issue of timing all the more tricky because they present numerous
factors that courts must balance against each other - in addition to the
over-arching concern about efficiency in a world of limited judicial
resources. Ultimately, then, the answers to the many questions presented
by Markman are bound to one another.
26. See W. Edward Bailey, Unresolved Issues in aPost-Markman World, in PATENT
LrTnoATON 1997, at 339, 343-49 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 492, 1997); David H. Binney & Toussaint L.
Myricks, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markman - How Have the Trial Courts
Adapted?, 38 IDEA 155,164-82 (1997); Constance S. Huttneret al.,Maranan Practice,
Procedures and Tactics, in PATENT LrnGATrON 1998, at 535, 538-48, 551-57 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-
531, 1998).
27. For definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, see infra text accompanying
notes 28-30.
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C. Extrinsic Evidence and Expert Testimony
Markman established two categories of evidence for patent claim
construction. The first is intrinsic evidence, which consists of the patent
claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Intrinsic
evidence is the most important tool for interpreting claims because it
represents a public record on which competitors should be able to rely
to determine the scope of a patentee's invention.29 The second category
of evidence is extrinsic evidence, which is all other evidence, including
articles, technical treatises, prior art, dictionaries, inventor testimony, and
expert testimony.3 °
Although Markman instructs that courts must rely primarily on
intrinsic evidence in construing patent claims, the extent to which they
may draw from extrinsic evidence has been further elaborated by
subsequent Federal Circuit decisions. In Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc.," the court determined that, in those situations in
which the clear meaning of a patent claim is set forth in the patent, its
prosecution history, and its specification, no extrinsic evidence should
be employed in interpreting the claim.32 In particular, the court opined
that the claim analysis should begin with the words contained in the
claims themselves and that those claim words should be construed in
light of the intrinsic evidence.33 Thusjudges should not base their claim
interpretations on expert testimony or on any other evidence not intrinsic
to the patent documents themselves, unless such intrinsic evidence is
insufficient to resolve any ambiguity in the meaning of the claim terms.34
In Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc.,35 however, the Federal
Circuit signaled a more liberal attitude -oward extrinsic evidence than
that shown in Vitronics. In Fromson, the accused process met the
standard dictionary definition of a claim term, and there was no contrary
definition in the specification or file history.36 Nonetheless, the district
court entered a judgment of non-infringement based on its finding that
28. See Marlanan 1, 52 F.3d at 979-80; see also Huttner et al., supra note 26, at 537.
29. See Markman 1, 52 F.3d at 978-79.
30. See id. at 980-81.
31. 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
32. See idL at 1582-83. The court engaged in a similar discussion in Bell & Howell
Document Management Products Co. v. Altek Systems, 132 F.3d 701, 705 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
33. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. The court thus recognized the established patent
law principle that a patentee may be his or her own lexicographer and, as such, may use
words in ways inconsistent with or contrary to their ordinary meaning. See id.
34. See id. at 1583; Bell & Howell, 132 F.3d at 706.
35. 132 F.3d 1437, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
36. See id. at 1442-45.
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the term, as used in the claims, required a feature that the accused
product did not have. 7 In so holding, the district court was required to
resolve conflicting extrinsic evidence about the technology s The
Federal Circuit affirmed, expressly endorsing the district court's use of
extrinsic evidence. It acknowledged Markman's comments concerning
extrinsic evidence but rejected a formulaic approach, noting that the
"general rule" is "adaptable to the needs of the particular case. 39 In
particular, the Federal Circuit endorsed the district court's use of
extrinsic evidence for the purpose of understanding the "finer points of
the technology" because it was that understanding that allowed the court
to understand the specification and what was required of the feature at
issue in the claim.4
Just three months later, however, the Federal Circuit questioned
Fromson in an en banc opinion in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies,
Inc.4" There, the court reaffirmed that claim construction is entirely a
matter of law for the court and is subject to de novo review on appeal.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit expressly rejected the notion that
"claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of
fact."'42 While Cybor does not directly address the issue of extrinsic
evidence, the court acknowledged that it was "difficult to reconcile the
language and reasoning" in Fromson with the Federal Circuit's analysis
in Markman.43
Cybor itself, however, provides the necessary tools to accomplish
that reconciliation. The Cybor court noted that, although a district court
should not make factual findings or credibility determinations on the
basis of extrinsic evidence, it may use extrinsic evidence as an aid "in
coming to a correct conclusion as to the true meaning of the language
employed in the patent." Thus, Cybor recognizes that, to construe
37. See Id. at 1444-45.
38. See id. at 1444.
39. Id
40. Id at 1443-45; see also Key Pharm. v. Hereon Lab. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("This court has made strong cautionary statements on the proper use of
extrinsic evidence ... which might be misread by some members of the bar as restricting
a trial court's ability to hear such evidence. We intend no such thing. To the contrary,
trial courts generally can hear expert testimony for background and education on the
technology implicated by the presented claim construction issues, and trial courts have
broad discretion in this regard.") (emphasis in original).
41. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
42: 1aat 1455.
43. Id at 1454 n.3.
44. Id. The split within the Federal Circuit on the use of extrinsic evidence in claim
interpretation remained evident in the "additional views" of Judges Newman and Mayer,
who noted that "t]he Federal Circuit's ruling that extrinsic evidence must be restricted
unless there is a facial ambiguity in the meaning of the claim is an unnecessary restraint
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claims, it may well be necessary for district courts to rely on expert
testimony but that, as they do so, they are only seeking background
information and other guides to interpretation and are not making factual
findings."
This is precisely the result that the Federal Circuit reached in Pitney
Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.' Once again addressing the use of
extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit noted that "Vitronics does not
prohibit courts from examining extrinsic evidence, even when the patent
document is itself clear."'47 The Court further noted that "Vitronics does
not set forth any rules regarding the admissibility of expert testimony as
to evidence," and that "there are no prohibitions in Vitronics on courts
hearing evidence from experts." Describing the appropriate use of
extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit stated:
[U]nder Vitronics, it is entirely appropriate,
perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult
trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that
the claim construction it is tending to from the
patent file is not inconsistent with clearly
expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held
understandings in the pertinent technical field.
This is especially the case with respect to
technical terms .... Indeed, a patent is both
a technical and a legal document. While a
judge is well-equipped to interpret the legal
aspects of the document, he or she must also
interpret the technical aspects of the
document, and indeed its overall meaning,
on potentially useful evidence." Id. at 1480. "
45. A court could hold a hearing in which it receives both intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence by first hearing intrinsic evidence and then, if necessary, hearing extrinsic
evidence, as suggested in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583-84
(Fed. Cir. 1996). By contrast, a court could receive both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
and then determine the evidence on which it will base its claim construction order. See
Michael 0. Sutton et al., Don't Miss the Mark Man!: Recent Trends and Evidentiary
Considerations in Marlanan Hearings, in 18TH ANNuAL INST1trrE ON COMPUTER LAW
867, 892 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 507, 1998); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F.
Supp. 844 (D. Del. 1995) (issuing a claim construction order after a two-day hearing
during which each party presented technical experts); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co.
of Japan, 906 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same).
46. 182 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
47. Id. at 1308.
48. Id,
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from the vantage point of one skilled in the
art. Although the patent file may often be
sufficient to permit the judge to interpret the
technical aspects of the patent properly,
consultation of extrinsic evidence is
particularly appropriate to ensure that his or
her understanding of the technical aspects of
the patent is not entirely at variance with the
understanding of one skilled in the art."'
In their concurrence, Judges Rader and Plager expressly
acknowledged the benefits of extrinsic expert testimony: (1) providing
"a propertechnological contextto understandthe claims"; (2) explaining
"the meaning of claim terms as understood by one of skill in the art"; and
(3) assisting the trial court in understanding "the patent process itself."5
The concurring judges specifically described Pitney Bowes as restating
the role of expert testimony and applauded the Federal Circuit's "effort
to express more trust in the 'broad latitude' and 'considerable leeway'
afforded presiding trial judges in assessing the reliability of expert
testimony."-''
Pitney Bowes articulates the most sensible and appropriate use of
extrinsic evidence. The literal directive of Vitronics had led many
district courts to unnecessarily confine themselves to consideration of
only the intrinsic evidence. But trial judges typically do not qualify as
being "skilled in the art" of the technology at issue. That is, they
normally are not well-versed in the technical language and processes
described in the patent claims that they must interpret. Indeed, numerous
observers have raised doubts as to whether judges are able to render
competent claim interpretations without using extrinsic evidence, and,
in particular, hearing expert testimony, which is perhaps the most
important type of extrinsic evidence thatjudges rely on in understanding
the technical language of patent documents. Even the most experienced
intellectual property practitioners cannot simply read a patent and file
history and divine the correct meaning of claim terms; they too require
and seek information about the relevant technology. Thus, as one
commentator has noted, "[flor the average intellectual property litigant,
the notion that trial judges are uniquely qualified to divine and declare
as a matter of law the true meaning of a patent claim, or the scope of a
49. Id. at 1309 (internal citations omitted).
50. Id. at 1314.
51. Id. at 1315 (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176
(1999)).
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copyright, is nothing more than myth."52 Pitney Bowes's holding, that
a careful and correct claim construction must be educated by information
concerning the relevant technology and the patent process itself, is
simply a recognition of reality.
Some courts have sought innovative approaches to alleviating the
difficulties created by their status as laypersons in the realm of patent
interpretation. A few judges have begun to incorporate the services of
a neutral expert or technical advisor into the Markman hearing to help
the court understand the relevant technology or terms of art. Such
experts may be appointed under the court's inherent authority to appoint
such advisors, or they may be appointed under Federal Rule of Evidence
706."3 For example, a district court in Massachusetts, recognizing that
it lacked "an adequate basis in skill or knowledge of the relevant art to
draw definitive conclusions," appointed a technical advisor upon whom
both parties had agreed.' Another court likewise appointed such an
advisor, concluding that the advisor could "act as a sounding board for
the court's assessment of the scientific significance of the evidence" and
help. the court determine "the validity of any scientific evidence,
hypothesis or theory on which the experts base their testimony."55 In yet
another case, a court appointed a Rule 706 neutral expert who both
testified at the Markman hearing and issued a written report.56 The court
relied on the expert's report for understanding the technology at issue57
and on her testimony in construing the claims, regarding the testimony
as "extrinsic evidence."58
Regardless of what solution courts are turning to for more
information and background, the important point is that they seem to
need and want as much technical help as they can obtain. The courts are
correct in this desire because a well-informed claim construction is more
likely to be the right one. And Pitney Bowes has expressly
- 52. David W. Plant, The Lessons of Marknan's Progeny, ADR CURRENTS, Dec.
1998, at 13.
53. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 155-56 (1st Cir. 1988). Under the.
procedures set forth in Rule 706, the court mustprovide to the expert awritten description
of his or her duties, communicate the expert's findings to the parties, and allow the parties
to cross-examine the expert. See FED. R. EvID. 706(a). In addition, the parties may
depose the expert and call him or her to testify in court. See id.
54. MediaCorn Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17,29 (D. Mass. 1998).
55. Biogen, Inc.v. Amgen, Inc., No. CIVA.95-10496-RGS (D. Mass. Dec. 10,1996)
(memorandum and order for the Engagement of Technical Advisor), reprinted in
MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17,35-36 (D. Mass. 1998).
56. See Genentech, Inc. v. BoehringerMannheim Gmb-, 989 F. Supp. 359,361-65
(D. Mass. 1997).
57. See id at 368.
58. Id. at 364-65.
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acknowledged the legitimacy and appropriateness of courts' use of
extrinsic evidence.
The need for extrinsic evidence also has important implications for
the timing of the Markman hearing. Because such information is either
easier or harder to obtain depending on the timing and nature of the
claim interpretation, courts must consider the extent to which it will be
available as they decide when to resolve claim disputes.
D. Appellate Review of Claim Interpretations
Although, according to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court,
Markman should have ushered in greater uniformity, predictability, and
certainty in patent litigation, many believe that the holding has had the
opposite effect. This is largely because Federal Circuit review of claim
interpretation is de novo.
In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,59 Judge Rader pointed to
the high reversal rate in the Federal Circuit in 1997, noting that the court
had "reversed in whole or in part 53% of the cases from district
courts." Judge Rader further described a study that had reported that,
since Markman, the Federal Circuit had reversed, in whole or in part,
forty percent of claim interpretations by district courts." He concluded
that such a reversal rate provides "no... certainty at all" and merely
"opens the bidding," thus making it the least optimal rate. 2 In fact, as
he noted, a claim's meaning remains uncertain until "nearly the last step
in the process" - decision by the Federal Circuit. 3 "To get a certain
claim interpretation, parties must go past ... every step in the entire
course of federal litigation, except Supreme Court review.'"
Markman's ostensible rejection of extrinsic evidence in claim
interpretation plays a role in the Federal Circuit's high reversal rate. The
court's conclusion that only intrinsic evidence should be used to interpret
patent claims is consistent with the idea that the Federal Circuit is as able
as (or more able than) trial judges to complete the task."' When claim
59. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane).
60. Id, at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting).
61. See idL at 1476 & n.
62. Id. at 1476.
63. Id.
64. Id. As Judge Rader further noted, "[e]ven a rate that was much higher would
provide greater certainty." Id.; see also Margaret Cronin Fisk, Confusion Follows '96
Landmark Patent Case, NAT'L LJ., June 15, 1998, at Al, A20 (observing that, although
Markman appears to have resulted in increased summary judgments in patent
infringement cases, finality has been elusive "because of the high reversal rate for claim
interpretations").
65. See Rana, supra note 25, at 14.
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construction relies only on intrinsic evidence, there is little basis for
deferring to the determinations of the district court' because the district
court is no more able than the appeals court to evaluate the intrinsic
evidence.'
Also contributing to the lack of certainty is the fact that, although
claim construction is an interlocutory decision,68 and Markman hearings
have become prevalent, there has not been interlocutory review of trial
judges' claim interpretations. 9 As Judges Newman and Mayer noted in
1998, "[t]he Federal Circuit has thus far declined all such certified
questions."7 The result, according to some commentators, is that
"district courts have had to conduct unnecessary trials and sometimes
have had to conduct a second trial after the claim is interpreted on appeal
after final judgment."'"
Moreover, although the Federal Circuit in Marcnan I pointed to
predictability and uniformity as significant goals that would be furthered
by claim interpretation being a matter of law, the fact is that such
66. Cf Plant, supra note 52, at 13 ("Not surprisingly, the [Federal Circuit] judges
who reject extrinsic evidence reverse district court claim constructions about three times
as frequently as judges who accept such evidence and endorse deferring to the district
court.").
67. Thus, for example, in JT. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d
1563, 1570, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the Federal Circuit rejected not only the trialIjudge's
claim interpretation but also the interpretation advocated by the parties and every expert
witness who testified at trial. Instead, the Federal Circuit based its interpretation on a
brief excerpt from a single declaration at the end of a voluminous prosecution history. In.
CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Custom Optical Frames, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 508, 519-23 (D.
Md. 1995), a Maryland district court interpreted the claims of the patent at issue and
granted the patentees' motion for preliminary injunction. The Federal Circuit reviewed
this claim interpretation and affirmed it in a nonprecedential opinion. See CVl/Beta
Ventures, Inc. v. Custom Optical Frames, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-1070, 1996 WL 338388
(Fed. Cir. June 19, 1996). In a separate infringement action involving the same patent,
a New York district court reached the same conclusions regarding the claim
interpretations as did the Maryland court, which allowed the patentee to prevail. See
CVl/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 905 F. Supp. 1171,1175-89,1192 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
But on appeal, the Federal Circuit found error in the district court's claim interpretation
and reversed. See CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1152-62 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). The Federal Circuit thus reversed itself on what Marlonan and Markman I
teach is a question of law.
68. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng'g, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 93, 95
(D. Mass. 1997).
69. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
70. Id.
71. Huttner et al., supra note 26, at 558; see also Gasparo, supra note 19, at 761-62
(noting that a Markman hearing "should be held before trial and coupled with a quick
appellate review of the claim construction in order to circumvent any further inefficiency
that may result from proceeding via a wrong construction").
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predictability - predictability between cases - is achieved "at the
expense of predictability within the first case."72 As one observer has
noted, "[o]nce the Federal Circuit has stated its interpretation of a claim,
that interpretation should be followed in future litigation involving the
same patent, based on stare decisis."73 At the same time, however,
"predictability is decreased within the first case because the trial judge's
interpretation is more likely to be reversed."'74 The result is that
predictability is increased only if a patent is litigated more than once.75
The uncertainty engendered by a de novo appellate review also has
implications for the timing of Markman hearings. The inherently
tentative nature of any claim construction by a district court - and the
unavailability of interlocutory review of that claim interpretation -
would seem to counsel against early interpretations on less than a fully
developed record. Instead, the better practice for district courts would
appear to be to defer claim interpretation until it is required for a
particular purpose (that is, summary judgment or instructions to thejury),
and the record before the court is as fully developed as possible.
E. Settlement
In the aftermath of Markman, some observers predicted that litigants
would be more likely to settle in cases in which claim construction took
place prior to trial because both parties would know whose case the
claim construction supported and would be able to predict their chances
of winning. 6 Yet it now appears that Markman has had the unintended
effect of prolonging the litigation process rather than promoting
settlement. The uncertainty that attaches to claim construction due to the
Federal Circuit's record of reversing a large percentage of claim
interpretations on appeal often leads the parties to proceed with the trial
in order that the Federal Circuit may review the district court's
interpretation. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, a claim
interpretation that is unfavorable can be appealed only after trial when
72. Rana, supra note 25, at 15.
73. Id.
74. Ma
75. See id.
76. See Steven D. Glazer & Steven J. Rizzi, Markman: The Supreme Court Takes
Aim at Patent Juries, 5 J. PROP. RTs. 2, 4--5 (1996). Of course, even when claims are
litigated multiple times, there is no guarantee ofuniformity. See supra note 67; CVI/Beta
Ventures, Inc. v. Tura, LP, 112 F.3d 1146,1152-60 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding error in the
district court's claim interpretation, even though that interpretation was itself based on an
interpretation that the Federal Circuit had affirmed).
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the entire case is appealed." In addition, the district court itself may
later alter its claim interpretation, especially in cases in which claim
construction is done prior to discovery, such as in tandem with the
adjudication of a motion for a preliminary injunction."
Markman has hampered settlement in another way: when the claim
interpretation is favorable to the patent holder, the prospects of recovery
increase, and, in the words of one patent lawyer, "the defendants feel
they have to go to trial."79 Once again, the high rate of reversal at the
next level reinforces for defendants that they will have another
opportunity for success further down the road.8" The overall effect is
that "judges' interpretations of patent claims have often spurred
intransigence rather than a rush to settle."'" The result for the question
of timing is that the possibility of settlement provides no reason for
courts to decide claim interpretation issues earlier than they might
otherwise.
III. TIMING
Just as the issues presented above have proven controversial, the
procedure that judges should follow in interpreting claims has also
proved to be a subject of scholarly and judicial debate. A particular
source of confusion has been the issue of when during in the litigation
process a court should interpret the patent claims in dispute." This Part
77. See Fisk, supra note 64, at A20 (quoting William F. Lee).
78. See Huttner et al., supra note 26,'at 544; see also Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v.
DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Marlanan does not obligate
the trial judge to conclusively interpret claims at an early stage in the case.");
International Comm. Material, Inc. v. Ricoh Co., 108 F.3d 316, 318 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(acknowledging that the district court's claim construction was only "tentative" because
there remained "substantial open issues and questions that must be litigated"); Vivid
Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng'g, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D. Mass. 1997);
Nova Biomedical Corp. v. i-STAT Corp., 980 F. Supp. 614,616 (D. Mass. 1997). Other
courts, by contrast, have deemed their early interpretations conclusive. See Boehringer
Ingelheim Animal Health, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 984 F. Supp. 239, 245-53
(D.NJ. 1997), andNo. CIVA.96-04047,1998 WL271764, at*3 (D.N.J. Apr. 27,1998).
79. Fisk, supra note 64, at A20 (quoting Roy E. Hofer).
80. See id
81. Id. atAl.
82. There is a distinction between the optimal time for a Markman hearing from the
perspective of the litigants and the optimal time from the perspective of the court. That
is, whereas the optimal time for the litigants depends on the particular strengths and
weaknesses of the specific issues in the case, the court's evaluation is instead based on
an institutional perspective. The discussion that follows weighs the pros and cons of
various timing possibilities from an institutional and judicial efficiency perspective,
attempting to encompass considerations that are important for both the court and the
parties.
[Vol. 13
Still Adjusting to Markman
reviews the options available to judges as they consider the timing issue,
and argues that the optimal time for claim construction is when the court
considers the parties' motions for summary judgment. It begins in the
following section by establishing that conducting a hearing for the
purpose of construing claims is preferable to interpreting claims on the
basis of the paper record alone.
A. IHearing vs. Paper Record
As an initial matter, a court may interpret the claims on the basis of
the paper record alone, in the context of a hearing with attorney
argument only, or in a hearing that includes both attorney argument and
testimony from witnesses. The court may construe the claims only on
the basis of the paper record, for example, in the course of deciding a
motion for summary judgment on an issue involving claim
construction. 3 In such situations, the court may consider extrinsic
evidence in the form of technical treatises, deposition testimony of
witnesses, and affidavits by expert witnesses."
Ideally, claim construction takes place in the context of a hearing,
whether with attorney argument only or with witness testimony as well.
The hearing gives the court an opportunity to hear, evaluate, and
question the argument by counsel and/or the testimony from expert
witnesses regarding the meaning of the disputed terms in the patent
claims. 5 These advantages also accrue if claim construction takes place
during the jury trial itself.
The disadvantage ofholding a separate evidentiary hearing for claim
construction issues is that the court must in essence hold two trials, and
the expert witnesses often have to testify twice regarding the same
issues - once before the court and once before thejury.8' This not only
increases the burden on already-overloaded district courts; it also
increases litigation costs borne by the parties and the demands on expert
witnesses. 7 These problems are avoided when the court construes the
claims on the basis of the paper record. Furthermore, in such situations
the court may still receive argument and expert testimony through
affidavits and declarations submitted by the parties.
83. See Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 661-62; Sutton et al., supra note 45, at 891.
84. SieElfAtochemN. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844,848
(D. Del. 1995).
85. See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76,79 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (observing that a judge faced with "conflicting views of technical terms may
prudently enlist the aid of qualified experts to determine the meaning ofthe claim terms").
86. See Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 663.
87. See id at 663-64.
No. 1]
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
Relying only on a stack of documents to construe the claims,
however, deprives a court of the benefit of being able to ask questions
of the attomneys or the expert witnesses. Although that result may be
acceptable when none of the disputed claim terms is ambiguous, the
question and answer format of a hearing is often crucial when a claim
term is ambiguous. And, in virtually every case, when the district court
endeavors to divine the meaning of a claim term, it confronts ambiguity
in the term. The complexity of the technical issues in most patent
infringement litigation88 and the likelihood that the patent documents
alone may not be fully explanatory mean that it is often preferable for
courts to hear arguments or expert testimony prior to construing the
claims. 9 Thus, unless the court is certain that none of the claims is
ambiguous, conducting a Markman hearing, even without regard to
when in the litigation it takes place, is undoubtedly preferable to
construing the claims on the basis of the paper record alone.'
Assuming that holding a Markman hearing is the most appropriate
means of resolving claim construction issues, the question of when to
hold the hearing remains subject to substantial debate. District courts
have discretion to determine when and in what format claim
interpretation will take place.9' They may construe the claims "anytime
after the defendant has answered and prior to entry of judgment."'
Although some courts charged with interpreting patent claims have
declined to hold Markman hearings at all,' most courts have held
them."
88. See HERBERT F. SCHWATZ, PAT'mT LAW AND PRACTCE 130 (2d ed. 1995).
89. See Bailey, supra note 26, at 345-46; Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 662-63;
see also Moll v. Northern Telecom, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-5451, 1995 WL 733389, at
*10-11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 1995).
90. See Northern Telecom, 1995 WL 733389, at *3, *10-11 (denying a partial
summary judgment motion requiring claim construction until a Markman hearing was
held and a "more developed record" was established).
91. See Huttner et al., supra note 26, at 539.
92. Sutton et al., supra note 45, at 891.
93. See Fisk, supra note 64, atA20 (quoting James H.A. Pooley); see also Interactive
Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., No. CIV.A.95-6871, 1998 WL 247485, at * 1 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1998) ("The court notes at the outset that no Markman hearing is
needed in this case because the court does not require expert or other testimony to aid it
in its claim consiruction."); LRC Elecs., Inc. v. John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc., 974 F.
Supp. 171,182 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding thatnohearingwas neededto interpret asingle
disputed claim term, even though that term was ambiguous); Brosnan v. Rollerblade, Inc.,
No. CIVA.97-0782, 1998 WL 209155, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 1998).
94. See John B. Pegram, Markman andIts Implications, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 560, 566 (1996); ABA Intell. Prop. Litig. Subcommittee, Survey Results of
Markman Proc., 1996-1997 Annual Report [hereinafter ABA Survey].
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Among those courts utilizing Markman hearings, the timing of the
hearing has been greatly inconsistent.95 According to a survey of
Markman procedures conducted by the Intellectual Property Law Section
of the American Bar Association, most judges interpret the disputed
patent claims prior to trial.' Of those judges, most hold the Markman
hearing near the close of discovery or during the period in which
dispositive motions are filed. Other courts wait until they have heard all
of the evidence during the trial to determine the meaning of the claims.97
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has stated that "Markman does not obligate
the trial judge to conclusively interpret claims at an early stage in a case.
A district court may exercise its discretion to interpret the claims at a
time when the parties have presented a full picture of the claimed
invention and prior art."98
A variety of options are available to district courts as they determine
when to hold a Markman hearing. They may hold the hearing at the
outset of the case - that is, prior to the completion of any discovery -
or during factual discovery. Alternatively, they may hold the hearing
after discovery - an option which,, in turn, encompasses four
possibilities: claims may be interpreted after fact discovery is complete
but before expert discovery has been conducted, after all discovery is
complete, at the time that the summary judgment motions are filed, or
just before opening arguments in the trial. A final option is to interpret
the claims during trial at the close of evidence, prior to instructing the
jury."
95. See Fisk, supra note 64, at A20.
96. See Sutton et al., supra note 45, at 891; ABA Survey, supra note 94.
97. See, e.g., Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. CIV.A.95-218-
SLR, 1998 WL 151411 (D. Del. Mar. 13, 1998) (bench trial); Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Cellpro, 931 F. Supp. 303 (D. Del. 1996) (jury trial).
98. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
99. The Federal Circuit has also suggested that it is permissible for district courts to
construe claims after the trial is complete. See Markman1,52 F.3d at 981. For example,
post-trial claim construction, which occurred in Markman, may be done in the context of
a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 62 F.3d
1388, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that, because claim interpretation is a legal issue,
the court may regard the jury's claim interpretation as an advisory determination). Thus,
it may be acceptable for a court to "submit the claim interpretation to the jury, obtain an
advisory opinion, and then defer the Court's interpretation to post-trial motions." Bailey,
supra note 26, at 348.
Although such a procedure accords with the court's dictates in Markman 1,
construing the claims after the completion of the trial is not advisable because it is
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's warning that the district court in Markmnan "should
have instructed the jury as to the meaning of the claims:' Bailey, supra note 26, at 348
(quoting Markman 1, 52 F.3d at 981-82).
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The remainder of this Part focuses on these options. Section B
concludes that the disadvantages of resolving claim disputes during the
trial outweigh the advantages such that the post-trial option fades from
the spectrum of practical choices. The remaining sections evaluate pre-
trial claim construction hearings. The primary question in this analysis
is whether the hearing should occur at the outset of the case, just before
trial, or somewhere in between. Thus, Section C considers the viability
of holding the claim construction hearing prior to discovery, while
Section D evaluates the relative merits of post-discovery claim
construction. Finally, Section E breaks down post-discovery claim
construction into four timing options: after fact discovery but before
expert discovery, after all discovery, at the time summary judgment
motions are considered, or just before opening arguments in the trial. It
further explains why the most desirable time for holding a Markman
hearing is concurrent with the court's consideration of the parties'
inevitable summary judgment motions.
B. Post-Trial Claim Interpretation
District court judges may construe the patent claims sometime
during the trial, such as just prior to instructing the jury at the close of
evidence."° In this approach, all evidence, including that relating to
claim construction, is heard at a single trial before both the judge and the
jury. Expert witnesses testify both as to infringement and validity and,
possibly, as to their interpretation of the disputed patent claims. Once all
of the evidence has been presented, "the court, presumably in connection
with requests for jury instructions from the parties and after a charge
conference, formulates its views on claim interpretation and instructs the
jury thereon at the same time the other jury instructions are given. '
The court also would presumably instruct the jury to disregard evidence
rendered irrelevant by the court's claim construction. The jury would
then make the determination as to infringement and validity.
Part of the rationale behind a later hearing is that, in cases in which
"significant liability questions" remain after the claims have been
interpreted, stopping early to interpret the claims merely postpones the
trial and the resolution of the litigation."° Thus, deferring interpretation
until the last possible moment promotes efficiency in the expenditure of
100. See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64F.3d 1553,1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 894 F. Supp. 819, 826 (D. Del. 1995).
101. Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 664.
102. See Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 162.
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judicial resources.0 3 The strongest reason for interpreting claims at a
later stage, however, is that the judge may be in the best position to
resolve disputes as to the meaning of claims only after he or she has
heard the entirety of the evidence "in the context of the overall case"" 4
and thereby understands "not only what the parties assert as to the
meaning of the claims, but also how those meanings affect the entire
case."'0 5 The importance of the specific words in the patent documents
"is often better understood when the background of the prior art, the
history of the invention and the overall commercial setting are fully
explained, as usually happens at trial.""'6 Much of this background is
absent when the claims are interpreted during a separate Markman
hearing because courts in such cases have a strong incentive to minimize
the use of evidence that must in any event be presented at trial."'7 And
parties will accordingly limittheevidence they present.' The presumed
effect of these factors is that, prior to trial, the information will be
presented in a more restricted manner, and the judge will likely have a
circumscribed appreciation of the patented innovation's history and the
range of prior art."
However, late claim interpretation is accompanied by more
disadvantages than advantages. As an initial matter, the practical effect
of a court's decision to construe the claims only after hearing all of the
evidence is that the court may well be unable to instruct the jury until
after a delay of several days, during which it interprets the claims."0 In
the period of time after the close of the evidence and before jury
instructions are given, the judge has to review all of the evidence, hear
arguments on the relevant legal issue, and interpret the claims."' This
means that the jury must wait, perhaps several days, for the judge to
complete this process, during which time the evidence loses its freshness
103. See Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 665.
104. George E. Badenoch, Proceeding in the Gray Area After Markman, INTELL.
PROP. STRATEGIST, June 1996, at 4.
105. Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 162.
106. Badenoch, supra note 104, at 5.
107. See id. at 4.
108. See Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 162.
109. See id.; see also Gasparo, supra note 19, at 745 n.98 (noting that a late
interpretation allows the court "to hear a more complete and thorough array of evidence
throughout the progression of an entire trial");. Sutton et al., supra note 45, at 893
(observing that late claim interpretation permits the court "to fully consider and weigh all
the evidence concerning claim constiuction prior to issuing its decision"); see, e.g., Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 894 F. Supp. 819 (D. Del. 1995) (issuing on the final day of
trial an opinion that included jury instructions on claim construction); Lucas Aerospace,
Ltd. v. Unison Indus., LP, 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3 (D. Del. 1995).
110. See Pegram, supra note 94, at 566.
I 11. See Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 668.
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in their minds."' Thus, although late interpretation is efficient in the
sense that it eliminates the need for a preliminary hearing for claim
construction, it is inefficient in the sense that it can lengthen the trial."'
Moreover, when the court finally construes the claims, it may well adopt
a claim interpretation different from those proposed by the parties. As
a consequence, it may be necessary to resume the presentation of
evidence in order to allow the parties to present evidence relevant to the
claims as properly construed." 4
More importantly, in cases in which the court does not construe the
claims until after the close of evidence, the parties must offer evidence
under the "correct" claim interpretation, whatever that might ultimately
be."' Such a format forces the parties to "provide testimony relevant to
alternative claim constructions, including alternative theories of
infringement... ."6 Doing so, however, makes an already complex
proceeding still more complicated and will inevitably cause confusion
for thejury."7 Yet avoiding the delay, complication, and confusion can
be achieved only if the parties present their entire case based on a single
claim construction- one that may turn out to be incorrect." It is thus
doubtful that the parties will dare to base their case on a claim
construction that has yet to be determined." 9 As one commentator has
observed, "[w]aiting until the close of evidence or the charging
conference requires the litigants to proceed with the trial without
knowing the most important ground rules, and either to 'roll the dice' on
one hoped-for interpretation of the claims or present complex evidence
under alternative claim construction theories."'20
An equally fundamental difficulty with postponing claim
interpretation until trial derives from the fact that once the interpretation
112. See LucasAerospace, 890 F. Supp. at 332 n.3 (pointing out the conflict between
the need not to create a "jury hiatus" and the importance of claim construction on the
outcome of most patent cases).
113. See Sutton et al., supra note 45, at 893; Badenoch, supra note 104, at 5 (noting
that late interpretation "lengthens and complicates" the trial).
114. See Huttner et al., supra note 26, at 539-40; see also Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc.
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Del. 1995) ("However, in ajury
trial, delaying resolution of [claim construction] until trial may raise serious practical
problems ofhowto adequately and fairly rule on these often difficult and vitally important
issues at the close of evidence while a jury waits.").
115. See Sutton et al., supra note 45, at 897.
.116. Huttner et al., supra note 26, at 548; see Badenoch, supra note 104, at 5
(observing that, to cover their bases, parties must "present evidence under alternative
claim interpretations").
117. See Badenoch, supra note 104, at 5.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
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is complete, the judge must essentially have thejury disregard testimony
that it has already heard. 2 ' If the court "uses" the testimony of one of
the testifying experts.on the basis that the testimony was helpful in
interpreting the claim,'it is simultaneously rejecting as unhelpful the
testimiony of the other expert. However, because the jury has already
heard the "other" expert's testimony, there arises the question of what,
if anything, the court should tell the jury about that testimony.'2 The
court could say nothing and leave the jury to surmise from the jury
instructions that it should disregard the other expert's testimony on the
meaning of the claims, as well as any of the expert's opinions that were
based on that interpretation.' Alternatively, the court could strike the
testimony of the other expert, and opinions premised thereon, instructing
the jury to ignore it. A final option is for the court to instruct the jury
that it may credit the testimony of the other expert to the extent that it is
not based on the erroneous claim interpretation but that it should
disregard that part of the testimony that concerns claim interpretation.'
24
Whatever the court chooses, its acceptance of the testimony of one
of the experts is an implicit indication that the other expert lacks
credibility.' This is problematic because, under Markman, claim
interpretation is not a factual determination. Markman appears to dictate
that, when the experts have different opinions about the meaning of the
terms, the court should construe the claims in accord with the testimony
that is most congruous with the patent documents. 2 6 After all, under
Markman, courts are not to choose between experts based on their
credibility; rather, when a court accepts one expert's testimony while
rejecting the other's, it "is not crediting certain evidence over other
evidence."' 27  But this is a conundrum: the court receives expert
testimony in the firstplace only because those documents are ambiguous.
Thus, unless the court makes a credibility determination to construe the
ambiguous claim terms, it is unclear what standards should guide the
decision."
121. See Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 665.
122. See id. at 665-66.
123. See i
124. See id.; see also Badenoch, supra note 104, at 5 ("[]f the parties present
testimony in support of their respective claim interpretations at trial and the district court
later decides that issue and instructs the jury on the correct claim interpretation, the court
will in effect be instruciing the jury that one side's expert is wrong on claim construction,
thereby damaging that expert's credibility on other issues as well.").
125. See Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 665-66.
126. Seeid. at666.
127. Maranan 1,52 F.3d at 981.
128. See Lee & Stoner, supra note 17, at 668.
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C. Pre-Discovery Claim Interpretation
Although a court may hold a Markman hearing either before or
during trial, most judges believe that it is more efficient to hold it prior
to trial. Early claim interpretation "may lead to resolution or disposition
of many cases earlier in time and at far less expense to the litigants." 29
Further, even if a pre-trial hearing does not dispose of the case, it at least
permits the parties to determine the next step in the litigation process.
After claim construction, the alleged infringer (assuming the court has
adopted its interpretation) may wish to make a motion for summary
judgment on the basis that there is no genuine issue of material fact on
the issue of infringement. Because the claim construction informs the
litigants which party is most likely to succeed at ajury trial, the parties
may also have incentive to engage in settlement negotiations. Finally,
even if the parties choose not to pursue any of these strategies, they will
at least be in a better position to focus their trial strategies. But a court's
decision to hold a pre-trial Markman hearing does not end the inquiry.
There remains the question of whether the hearing should be held prior
to or during discovery, sometime after fact or expert discovery has been
completed, or just prior to trial.
Some courts that have held the hearing prior to discovery have
reasoned that early claim construction enables the parties and the court
to "focus discovery in a way that makes more efficient use of party and
court resources as the case proceeds."' 3 ° Discovery into various "validity
defenses and the preparation of 'alternative' cases, depending on which
interpretation is adopted, can be deferred and perhaps avoided
altogether."'' From this perspective, holding Markman hearings after
the close of discovery, as has been customary for some courts,' is
inefficient because of the possibility that parties will find it necessary to
modify their theories and to conduct additional discovery to support
those theories.' Likewise, any expert reports that may have been
129. Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 162.
130. Huttner et al., supra note 26, at 538 (citing as an example Vivid Techs., Inc. v.
American Science & Eng'g, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D. Mass. 1997)); see also Letter
from Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, Senior Partner, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, to Members
of the Marlkman Procedures Subcommittee of the AIPLA Federal Litigation Committee
2 (Feb. 3, 1999) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law &.Technology.) (noting that
an early hearing "galvanizes the issues that need to be addressed during discovery").
131. Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 162.
132. See, e.g., ADC Telecomms., Inc. v. Siecor Corp., 954 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del.
1997); Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., No. CIV.A.95-2123, 1998 WL
150946 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1998).
133. See Huttner et al., supra note 26, at 539.
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prepared prior to the formulation of the new theories may need to be
revised.'34 In addition, an early hearing may also promote settlement.3
Some district courts have institutionalized a practice of holding so-
called "Markman trials" early in cases. In order to establish a "uniform
set of procedures" and to "reduce the 6ccasion for numerous and
conflicting Standing Orders by individual judges,"'36 the Northern
District of California promulgated local rules for Markman hearings.
These rules require that the party alleging infringement submit a
Proposed Claim Construction Statement early in the case, with the
alleged infiinger responding sixty days later with its own Claim
Construction Statement. 37 These documents must state all "uncommon
meanings of words or phrases in the claim" and must provide all
references contained in the specification, in the prosecution history, or
in extrinsic evidence that "support, describe, or explain each element of
the claim."'38 The parties must next prepare a Joint Claim Construction
Statement, which must contain a list of claims that the parties agree
upon, along with each party's version of the disputed claims. 39 If the
parties plan to call more than one witness, they must identify each of the
witnesses and the subject matter of each of the witness's testimony."4
The court then must set a date for the hearing, and the parties must
comply with a briefing schedule.' Because, under these rules, the
parties must adhere to a variety of mandatory initial disclosures, the
discovery process is more productive. 42  As one commentator has
pointed out, "[t]he result of such local rules will be to provide a judge
with an effective evidentiary procedure to construe claims as a matter of
law. This is precisely what is needed to make the process more efficient
as well as expeditious."' 14
3
134. See id. (citing Cybor Corp. v.'FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en bane) (Rader, J., dissenting); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan,
911 F. Supp. 76,79 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)).
135. This effect is only speculative, however, as the Federal Circuit's frequent
reversals of trial judges' claim interpretations militate against settlement. See supra text
accompanying notes 76-81.
136. N.D. CAL R. 1-2(a).
137. See William F. Lee, The Ever Confounding Question of Claim Construction:
Markman and its Progeny, in PATENT LrmGAT1ON 1998, at 151, 176 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 531, 1998);
N.D. CAL. R. 16-10.
138. N.D. CAL. R. 16-10.
139. See N.D. CAL. R. 16-11.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Gasparo, supra note 19, at 755.
143. lId at 755-56.
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Although pre-discovery claim interpretation may encourage
settlement and, more importantly, focus discovery, ultimately its
inefficiencies outweigh those benefits. In particular, prior to discovery,
more claim limitations are in dispute, and there is generally more
disagreement among the parties regarding the nature of the litigation.
Thus, pre-discovery claim construction forces judges to analyze claim
limitations in the abstract, before the parties have a cleai idea of what is
at stake in the litigation and what terms will prove decisive in the case.
Early claim interpretation is especially senseless when one considers the
likely scenario that the interpretation of only one limitation may decide
the whole case.
To be sure, in the minority of cases in which the relevant technology
and the state of the art are less complex and in which the key issues
concern claim construction, it may seem logical for the court to construe
the claims early in the litigation."' But even in such cases, late claim
interpretation may be more desirable. If the case is a simple one,
presumably discovery will not be unduly burdensome and will provide
the benefit of making evident which claim limitations are most
important. And, more importantly, post-discovery claim construction
will be more definitive because the court will have a more complete
context and more background information for determining the meaning
of the terms.
D. Post-Discovery Claim Interpretation
Although pre-discovery Markman hearings may be appropriate in
some cases, holding the hearing at some point after fact discovery is
usually abetter option.' Because an early (pre-discovery) hearing "will
not necessarily include all of the relevant prior art and other materials"
that may be available later, it may result in inefficiencies that could be
avoided by waiting to interpret claims at least until the close of fact
discovery.'" When the Markman hearing is held before trial but after
fact discovery, by contrast, the parties "have learned what they need to
144. See Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 185 ("[W]here the technology is
reasonably simple, and where the key issues revolve around claim interpretation, it may
be in both parties' interest to push for an earlier resolution of these issues, rather than
undergoing discovery on the entire range of issues which present themselves in most
patent litigation.").
145. As mentioned above and discussed in the following section, there are four points
following fact discovery and before trial during which claim construction could take
place: after fact discovery but before expert discovery, after all discovery, at the time of
summary judgment, or just prior to opening arguments in the trial.
146. Lewis, supra note 130, at 2.
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know about the case to fully understand and articulate their positions."'47
They will be able to provide the judge with the factual background
required for an understanding of the issues to be decided in claim
construction.'48 And, most importantly, they will have identified which
terms are in dispute. Thus, post-discovery claim interpretation presents
the first opportunity for the parties and the court to focus on what is
really at stake in the litigation. It renders claim construction more
efficient because, by the time fact discovery is complete, the parties
know the decisive issues in the litigation and are able to inform the court
accordingly. The court need not waste time and effort on a claim
construction that turns out to be irrelevant to the case.'49
Because atthe post-discovery stage the resolution of a claim dispute
is based on ample information, the court will most likely hold to that
interpretation for the remainder of the case - an outcome that is less
certain with earlier claim construction. Thus, if the judge interprets the
claim in favor of the plaintiff, infringement often "isn't seriously
contested" because claim interpretation issues are at the crux of many
patent cases. 50 If, by contrast, the interpretation favors the defendant,
"often there is frequently either no infringement or anticipation by prior
art becomes easy to prove."'' Even if the court denies summary
147. Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 184 ("The ideal timing for a Markman
hearing is probably shortly after the close of discovery, probably about sixty days before
trial, which is about the time when the Court will be considering summary judgment
motions.').
148. See id.
149. In addition, one court has suggested that, in situations in which the parties have
not yet determined which claims are in dispute, and the court construes the claims in the
abstract, the claim interpretation may violate the Constitution's "case and controversy"
limitation on judicial power and render the court's interpretations merely advisory. See
MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22, 24 n.6 (D. Mass. 1998)
(observing that the Markman hearing "should take place in the context of conventional
motion practice" because "[flree-standing Markman hearings" may "run afoul ofthe 'case
and controversy' limitation").
150. Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 161; see also Pegram, supra note 94, at
566-67; Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 936 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Del. 1996)
(holding a Markman hearing and ruling on the basis of the construction that no
infringement occurred); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting one party's motion for summary judgment after holding a
Markman hearing and issuing an order and opinion as to claim construction). Proceeding
in this way probably does not allow enough time to "arrange the proceedings for an
expedited appeal of the court's claim construction before trial." Pegram, supra note 94,
at 566. This shortcoming is of little moment, however, because the Federal Circuit has
granted only a small number of interlocutory appeals of a district court's claim
construction.
151. Binney & Myricks, supra note 26, at 161. But see Fisk, supra note 64, at A20
(noting that "[i]f the defendant loses significant points on the claims interpretation,...
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judgment because.there remains after interpretation a genuine issue as to
infringement, the parties will at least have agreed on what is disputed
and what is not."2
E. Optimal Time for Claim Interpretation
Even within the realm of post-discovery Markman hearings, there
are a number of timing alternatives. First, the court could hold the
hearing at the close of fact discovery, but prior to expert discovery.
Second, the hearing could be held after all discovery, including expert
discovery, has been completed. The third option available to the court
is to hold the hearing in tandem with its consideration of the parties'
summary judgment motions. Finally, the hearing could take place just
prior to opening arguments. All four options have the advantages of
post-discovery claim interpretation outlined in the previous section, but,
as this section explains, the third is optimal.
1. After Fact Discovery
The first option - interpreting the- claims after fact discovery but
prior to expert discovery - has the advantage that the experts giving
their opinion as to the issues of infringement or invalidity have the
benefit of the court's claim construction. Accordingly, they are able to
base their opinions on the court's actual interpretations, rather than
rendering multiple opinions on the basis of speculation about what the
interpretations ultimately could be. And that, of course, is the drawback
to the final three options: when claim construction takes place after both
fact and expert discovery, the expert must provide a variety of opinions,
depending on how many possible claim constructions there are, and does
not have the benefit of knowing the definitive meaning of the claims.
Yet holding the Markman hearing after expert discovery is complete
is preferable, despite this disadvantage. During discovery, the testifying
experts will render an opinion as to the issue of infringement or
invalidity and, in the process, will presumably testify as to the plausible
interpretations of the claims and the relevant technology. Such
testimony will help to educate the parties about the claims at issue and,
by the parties' motions and arguments, the court as well. By holding the
claim construction hearing after expert discovery is complete, the experts
will be able to educate and ultimately benefit the court as it interprets the
'[it] could still have a noninfringement defense or an invalidity defense or even prevail
on damages issues."' (quoting Roy E. Hofer)).
152. See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
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claims. This contribution of knowledge is especially important to the
court in light of the fact that judges" are not skilled in the art of the
technology of the patent whose terms they must interpret. They depend
heavily on the knowledge of experts, among other sources of
information, for insight into the nature of the invention at issue. This is
precisely what Pitney Bowes expressly recognized.'
2. After All Discovery
Because each of the final three options takes place after expert
discovery, each serves to educate the claim construction process and to
infuse it with additional information. Among these, however, the option
of holding the hearingjust after all discovery is complete - that is, after
expert discovery but prior to the summary judgment stage - is
undesirable because it requires the court to construe all of the claims in
dispute. This increases the work of already overburdened courts, and,
by virtue of the fact that claim construction is a particularly onerous task,
the effect is consequential. In light of the substantial judicial and
evidence-related resources that claim construction requires, if some of
the claims in dispute do not absolutely have to be evaluated and
interpreted to resolve the case, they should not be. By contrast, the task
of claim construction can be pared down and accomplished more
efficiently if the court employs the option of construing the claims at the
time that it considers the parties' summary judgment motions.
3. At the Summary Judgment Stage
By the time the parties submit their motions for summary judgment,
they will have had the time and necessary information to identify those
claim limitations that are in dispute. " Construing the claims at the time
of summary judgment has the added advantage that the court need
resolve only those claim issues on which the summaryjudgment motions
depend. If the court is able to grant summary judgment and thereby
dispose of the litigation, it need not construe the remaining disputed
claim limitations. If summary judgment does not resolve the case, the
court can construe the remainder of the disputed claim limitations prior
153. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
154. In certain cases the parties could move for summary judgment on a dispositive
issue early in the discovery phase of the case. Such a procedure makes sense, however,
only if the parties focus the court on one or two key claim limitations that could result in
summary judgment. It would not be appropriate in a situation in which the court would
be required to construe all or even several claim limitations.
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to opening arguments at trial.'55 By implication, then, the fourth
option - holding the hearing just prior to opening arguments - is too
late in the litigation to produce the benefits that result from interpretation
at the time summary judgment motions are considered.
The patent dispute between Biogen, Inc. and Berlex Laboratories,
Inc., "6 which is being litigated in the District of Massachusetts, provides
an example of this approach toward claim construction." 7 Prior to the
court's consideration of the parties' summary judgment motions, the
parties provided to the court written submissions concerning the basic
technology at issue and the patent prosecution process in general, and
describing the key legal issues. The court then held a one-day hearing
to do nothing other than hear this basic background information. With
the information from the technological presentation complete, the court
was prepared to construe the claimsjointly with its evaluation of whether
summary judgment was proper. In their summary judgment motions on
the issue of non-infringement of the patents, the parties expressly
directed the court to those claim limitations that would be decisive for
resolving the case on summary judgment. Though noting that other
claim limitations were also in dispute, the parties pointed out that
deciding issues presented in the motion did not require interpreting those
other disputed claims. Only the court's denial of summary judgment for
one of the parties would require the court to interpret the remaining
disputed claims that were not relevant to summary judgment.5
. Timing the Markman hearing to coincide with the summary
judgment stage also accommodates other issues, discussed in Part II, that
courts and litigants must balance against each other: the use of extrinsic
evidence, uniformity and certainty, and the desirability of settlement.
First, claim c6nstruction at the summary judgment stage balances the
strictures on courts' use of extrinsic evidence with judges' need for such
evidence in understanding the invention at issue. By the time claim
155. To the extent that, in interpreting the remaining disputed claims, the court
requires additional extrinsic evidence and expert opinion, it has the discretion to ask the
parties to submit supplemental expert reports.
156. Berlex Labs., Inc. v. Biogen, Inc., No. 96-12487-MLW (D. Mass. filed April 30,
1999),No. 98-11728-MLW (D. Mass. filed April 30,1999); Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Labs.,
Inc., No. 96-10916-MLW (D. Mass. filed April 30, 1999).
157. See Memorandum of Biogen, Inc. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
of Non-Infringement of "Single Construct" Claims of the '567 Patent (D. Mass. 1999)
(No. 96-10916-MLW).
158. This recommendation will be effective, however, only ifthe litigants do theirpart
in focusing on the decisive claim terms in their summary judgment motions.
Unfortunately, litigants often do the opposite, filing mountainous briefs containing all
conceivable arguments, including those that are best abandoned. This practice is at best
inefficient and has resulted in judicial fiustration with summary judgment.
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construction takes place, the parties will have completed both fact and
expert discovery, and, accordingly, will have discerned the disputed
claims and the subset of those claims that are decisive for summary
judgment. The parties will be able to focus the expert testimony as to
claim construction on those decisive claims and thereby avoid spending
their time and resources, or those of the court, on testimony about claims
that are not relevant. As a result, expert testimony will be more helpful,
thorough, and efficiently presented and will provide the court with
information commensurate with the requirements of the interpretation.
And, of course, the process of expert discovery will have produced other
similarly focused information on which the court may rely as it construes
the claims. To be sure, there is less information available at the post-
discovery stage as compared to the jury instruction stage. But the
measured nature of the information available to the court prior to trial is
more in keeping with the spirit of Markman and the notion that claim
interpretation should be conducted, to the extent possible, on the basis
of the patent documents.
Second, the nature of the appellate ieview of district courts' claim
interpretations also supports a summary judgment stage Markman
hearing. Just as the necessity for extrinsic evidence counsels against
holding the Markman hearing any earlier than at the summary judgment
stage, the nature of the appellate review process counsels against holding
the hearing any later than at summary judgment. Because review by the
Federal Circuit is de novo, there is little reason for a district court to hear
the entirety of evidence in the case before determining the meaning of
the claim terms. The courts that have been reversed have not been
exclusively those that used only scant extrinsic evidence; rather, it
appears that reversal is a fate met by claim constructions completed
through a wide array of procedures and on the basis of varying amounts
of extrinsic information. Thus, the court's absorption of all of the
evidence prior to interpreting the claims is a waste of courts' and the
litigants' time, not to mention that of the jurors.
Finally, settlement is not deterred by holding the claim construction
hearing at the summary judgment stage. Parties are more likely to settle
after they have identified what is really at stake, which is possible only
after at least some discovery. And, in any event, the timing of the
Markman hearing most likely has far less impact on the willingness of
the parties to settle than many commentators assumed immediately after
Markman was decided..
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IV. CONCLUSION
Markman has fundamentally changed the nature of patent litigation.
As courts and litigants struggle to develop the most efficient (in the case
of the courts) and advantageous (in the case of the parties) procedures
for implementing the holding, they must balance the strictures on, and
their need for, extrinsic evidence and the reality of de novo appellate
review. This holds with regard to judges' and parties' considerations
about the most desirable point in the litigation process for claim
interpretation to take place. When all of these factors are placed in the
analysis, there is generally one "right" time for a Markman hearing: after
all discovery has been completed, at the time the court considers the
parties' summary judgment motions. Although there may remain cases
in which earlier interpretation is more desirable, courts could begin to
calm the Markman storm by holding claim construction hearings, as a
default practice, at the summary judgment stage of the litigation.
